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Abstract
The paper extends the analysis of price competition among capac-
ity constrained sellers beyond duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. The
main focus is on the equilibrium payoffs under triopoly. The paper
also includes insightful examples highlighting features of equilibrium
which can arise in a triopoly but not in a duopoly. Most notably, the
supports of the equilibrium strategies need not be connected, nor need
be connected the union of the supports; further, an atom may exist for
a firm different from the largest one.
1 Introduction
The issue of price competition among capacity-constrained sellers has at-
tracted considerable interest since Levitan and Shubik’s [16] modern reap-
praisal of Bertrand and Edgeworth. Assume a given number of firms pro-
ducing a homogeneous good at constant and identical unit variable cost
up to some fixed capacity. Further, assume that rationing takes place ac-
cording to the surplus maximizing rule and that demand is a continuous,
non-increasing, and non-negative function defined on the set of non-negative
prices and is positive, strictly decreasing, twice differentiable and (weakly)
concave on a bounded initial interval. Then there are a few well-established
facts about equilibrium of the price game. First, at any pure strategy equi-
librium the firms earn competitive profit. However, a pure strategy equilib-
rium need not exist. In this case existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium
is guaranteed by Theorem 5 of [3] for discontinuous games. Under simi-
lar assumptions on demand and cost, the set of mixed strategy equilibria
was characterized by Kreps and Scheinkman [15] for the duopoly within a
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two-stage capacity and price game. This model was subsequently extended
to allow significant convexities in the demand function (by Osborne and
Pitchik, [18]) or differences in unit cost among the duopolists (by Deneckere
and Kovenock, [12]). This led to the discovery of new phenomena, such as
the possibility of the supports of the equilibrium strategies being discon-
nected and non-identical for the duopolists.
Progress has also been made on the characterization of mixed strategy
equilibria under oligopoly under the assumption of constant and identical
unit cost and the standard restrictions upon demand. Vives [20], amongst
others, characterized the (symmetric) mixed strategy equilibrium for the
case of equal capacities among all firms. In a previous paper we [10] gen-
eralized Vives result to the case in which the capacities of the largest and
smallest firm are sufficiently close. Within an analysis concerning horizontal
merging of firms Davidson and Deneckere [4] provided the complete anal-
ysis (apart from the fact that attention is restricted to equilibria in which
strategies of equally-sized firms are symmetrical) of a Bertrand-Edgeworth
game with linear demand, equally-sized small firms and one large firm with
a capacity that is a multiple of the small firm’s capacity.1
An important equilibrium property was seen to hold for general oligopoly:
the equilibrium payoff of (any of) the largest firm(s) is equal to the payoff
of the Stackelberg follower when the rivals supply their entire capacity ([2]
and [7]).2 As under duopoly, such a property appears to be a major building
block for the study of equilibria of the price game under oligopoly. As an
example, in a still unpublished paper Ubeda [19] compares discriminatory
and uniform auctions among capacity-constrained producers and obtains a
number of novel results on discriminatory auctions. (A discriminatory auc-
tion could be designed in such a way to be equivalent to Bertrand-Edgeworth
competition under the efficient rationing rule.) Based on the above men-
tioned property, Ubeda showed, among other things, that the maximum
1Davidson and Deneckere [4] assumed a given number of equally-sized firms some of
which merge. To see whether merging facilitates collusion in a repeated price game, they
had to characterize equilibria of the static price game for the resulting special asymmetric
oligopoly and hence mixed strategy equilibria when the new capacity configuration falls in
the mixed strategy region of the capacity space. Our study shows that, even in a triopoly,
a continuum of equilibria may exist even if each firm’s equilibrium payoff and the strategy
of the largest firm are the same at any equilibrium: see Example 1 in Section 5 Davidson
and Deneckere overlooked this possibility since rei restricted their attention to equilibria
that treat small firms symmetrically ([4], footnote 10, p. 123).
2The proof in [2] is carried out along the lines in [15] for the analogous result under
duopoly. After pointing out a mistake in that proof, [7] establishes correctly that result
along the same lines.
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and the minimum over all the supports of equilibrium strategies belong to
the support of the equilibrium strategies of any firm with the largest capac-
ity. More recently Hirata [14] has provided an extensive analysis of triopoly
with concave demand and efficient rationing: having highlighted some basic
features of mixed strategy equilibria under triopoly, he is able to analyze
how mergers between two firms would affect profitability in the different
circumstances. Most importantly, the characterization of the equilibrium
payoff of any of the largest firms has proven very effective when addressing
oligopolistic two-stage capacity and price game, at least under the assump-
tions of convex cost of capacity, the standard restrictions upon demand, and
efficient rationing: based on that property it can easily be shown that, in
fact, the Cournot outcome extends to oligopoly (see, for instance, [2] and
[17]).
The survey above suggests that the study of price competition with ca-
pacity constraints is relevant in many respects, such as mergers (hence regu-
lation), auctions, and price leadership.3 Yet, in the current state of the art,
a complete characterization of equilibria of the price game only exists for
special cases although a number of partial results have also been provided
for general oligopoly.
This paper is the first of a trilogy in which we provide a general analysis
of the triopoly. This study proves to be rewarding in terms of equilibrium
properties that are shown to possibly arise in the triopoly but not in the
duopoly, which is interesting per se but also as insights for the study of gen-
eral oligopoly. Our analysis differs in scope from Hirata’s since we provide a
complete characterization of mixed strategy equilibria: we reveal all qualita-
tive features possibly arising in the triopoly, including the facts highlighted
in [14].4 The main focus of the present paper is the equilibrium payoffs of
the firms. The payoff of the largest firm has been determined by Boccard
and Wauthy and others (see [2], [7], [19], [17], and [14]). Here we determine
the payoff of the middle sized firm (but see also [19]) and, by appropriately
partitioning the region where pure strategy equilibria do not exist, we iden-
tify the circumstances under which the payoff/capacity ratios of the smallest
3The relevance of mixed strategy equilibria of price games for the analysis of mergers
might also be viewed in a longer-run perspective, allowing for capacity decisions by the
merged firm and outsiders (on this, see Baik [1]). Characterizing mixed strategy equilib-
rium of the price game in a duopoly allows Deneckere and Kovenock [11] to endogenize
price leadership by the dominant firm when the capacity vector lies in the mixed strategy
region.
4Our own research and Hirata’s were conducted independently. Results were made
publicly available, in [8] and [13], respectively.
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firm and of the middle sized firm are the same and the circumstances under
which the smallest firm enjoys a higher payoff/capacity ratio. Furthermore,
in the latter circumstances, we identify the range in which the payoff of the
smallest firm must lie. Moreover we provide examples showing that the sup-
ports of the optimal strategies and their union may not be connected and
the maximum of the support of the equilibrium strategy of the smallest firm
may be charged with positive probability by that firm.
This research has led to several other discoveries. Several properties of a
duopolistic mixed strategy equilibrium prove to generalize to triopoly: the
values of the minimum and the maximum of the support of the equilibrium
strategy for any firm with the highest capacity (equal to pm and pM , re-
spectively, as defined in Section 3); the equilibrium payoff of any firm with
the second highest capacity. On the other hand, in a duopoly the supports
of the equilibrium strategies completely overlap, which need not be the case
in a triopoly.5 In a duopoly the region of the capacity space where no pure
strategy equilibrium exists can be partitioned in two subsets: one in which
both firms get the same payoff per unit of capacity and one in which the
smaller firm gets a higher payoff per unit of capacity. The latter subset
is characterized by the fact that the capacity of the larger firm is higher
than total demand at pm. In the triopoly, on the contrary, there are several
relevant subsets of the region where no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
• In one subset, as in the duopoly, the capacity of the largest firm is
larger than or equal to demand at pm. In this subset the other firms
get the same payoff per unit of capacity, higher than that of the largest
firm.6
• In another subset the sum of the capacities of the two largest firm is
smaller than or equal to demand at pm. In this subset all firms get
the same payoff per unit of capacity.
• In another subset both the smallest firms have the same size and the
capacity of the largest firm is smaller than demand at pm. In this
5That minima of the supports of the equilibfium strategies may differ has also been
recognized in [13] and [14].
6However, differently from the analogous subset in the duopoly, the equilibrium strate-
gies of the smallest firms are constrained but not uniquely determined (there is a continuum
of equilibria). This will be shown in the second paper of the trilogy where we will also
show that there are other subsets in which the equilibrium strategies of the two smallest
firms are similarly constrained and not uniquely determined, but not in the whole union
of the supports of equilibrium strategies. In these subsets the largest firm can meet total
demand at prices close to pM and all firms get the same payoff per unit of capacity.
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subset all firms get the same payoff per unit of capacity.
• The complement of the previous three subsets can be partitioned in
two parts. In one part the smallest firm gets a higher payoff per unit
of capacity than theothers, that in turn get the same payoff per unit of
capacity, a fact also discovered by [14]. Yet we determine the interval
where the payoff of the smallest firm must be and provide examples for
the exact determination of that payoff (a general rule for determining
that payoff will be provided in the third paper of the trilogy). In
the other part all firms get the same payoff per unit of capacity and
the supports of the largest and the smallest firms have a lower bound
equal to the lower bound of the overall price distribution, whereas the
middle sized firm set prices only at higher levels. This is an unusual
result and somewhat at odds with the rest of the parameter space.
Osborne and Pitchik [18] clarified that in duopoly, under the set of as-
sumptions on demand adopted here, the supports of equilibrium strategies
are connected, otherwise supports need not be connected. Quite differently,
we will prove that under triopoly the supports need not be connected and
even its union may not be connected, even with a concave demand function.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains definitions and
the basic assumptions of the model along with a few basic results on pure
strategy equilibrium. Section 3 deals with some general results concerning
mixed strategy equilibria under triopoly when pure strategy equilibria do
not exist (even if we will not prove it, many of the results presented in
Section 3 can be generalized to oligopoly). Section 4 provides the partition
mentioned above and determines also the constraints that the payoff of the
smallest firm need to fulfill. Sections 5 is devoted to some examples.
2 Preliminaries
Assumption 1. There are 3 firms producing a homogeneous good at the
same constant unit cost (normalized to zero), up to capacity. Without loss of
generality, we consider the subset of the capacity space (K1,K2,K3) where
K1 > K2 > K3 > 0 (1)
and we define K = K1 +K2 +K3.
Assumption 2. The market demand function is given by D(p) (demand
as a function of price p) and P (x) (price as a function of quantity x). The
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function D(p) is strictly positive on some bounded interval (0, p∗), on which
it is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing and such that pD(p) is
strictly concave; it is continuous for p > 0 and equals 0 for p > p∗; X =
D(0) < ∞. P (x) = D−1(x) on the bounded interval (0, X); the function
P (x) is continuous for x > 0 and equals 0 for x > X; p∗ = P (0) <∞.
Assumption 3. It is assumed throughout that any rationing is ac-
cording to the efficient rule. Consequently, let Ω(p) be the set of firms
charging price p: the residual demand forthcoming to all firms in Ω(p) is
max
{
0, D(p)−∑j:pj<pKj} = Y (p). If ∑i∈Ω(p)Ki > Y (p), the residual
demand forthcoming to any firm i ∈ Ω(p) is a fraction αi(Ω(p), Y (p)) of
Y (p), namely, Di(p1, p2, pn) = αi(Ω(p), Y (p))Y (p).
Our analysis does not depend on the specific assumption being made
on αi(Ω(p), Y (p)): for example, it is consistent with αi(Ω(p), Y (p)) =
Ki/
∑
r∈Ω(p)Kr as well as with the assumption that residual demand is
shared evenly, apart from capacity constraints, among firms in Ω(p).7
Let pc be the competitive price, that is
pc = P (K). (2)
We now provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a pure
strategy equilibrium and show that no pure-strategy equilibrium actually
exists when the competitive price is not an equilibrium. These results are
straightforward generalizations of similar results for the duopoly.
Proposition 1 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. (i) (p1, p2, p3) = (p
c, pc, pc)
is an equilibrium if and only if either
K −K1 > X, if X 6 K, (3)
or
K1 6 −pc
[
D′(p)
]
p=pc
= − P (K)
P ′(K)
, if X > K. (4)
In the former case the set of equilibria includes any strategy profile such
that Ω(0) 6= ∅ and ∑s∈Ω(0)−{j}Ks > X for each j ∈ Ω(0). . In the latter,
(pc, pc, pc) is the unique equilibrium.
(ii) No pure strategy equilibrium exists if neither (3) nor (4) holds.
7In this case, αi(Ω(p), Y (p)) = min{Ki/Y (p), αˆ(p)} where αˆ(p) is the solution in α of
equation
∑
i∈Ω(p) min{Ki/Y (p), α} = 1. Let M ∈ Ω(p) and KM > Ki (each i ∈ Ω(p)).
Then function
∑
i∈Ω(p) min{Ki/Y (p), α} is increasing in α over the range [0,KM/Y (p)]
and equal to
∑
i∈Ω(p) Ki/Y (p) > 1 for α = KM/Y (p).
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Proof (i) If K > X, for firm i charging pc = 0 is a best response to
rivals charging pc if and only if
∑
j 6=iKj > X. This holds for each i if
and only if
∑
j 6=1Kj > X. Then any strategy profile such that Ω(0) 6= ∅
and
∑
s∈Ω(0−{j})Ks > X for each j ∈ Ω(0) is an equilibrium. If X >
K, for firm i charging pc is a best response to rivals charging pc if and
only if
[
d[p(D(p)−∑j 6=iKj)]/dp]
p=pc
6 0. This holds for each i if and
only if K1 6 −pc [D′(p)]p=pc . Then there are no further equilibria, in
pure or mixed strategies. Indeed, consider a pure strategy profile such
that p = max{p1, p2, p3} > pc. If #Ω(p) = 1, then firm i ∈ Ω(p) earns
pmax{0, D(p)−∑j:pj<pKj} < pcKi. If #Ω(p) > 1 and D(p)−∑j:pj<pKj >
0 (with D(p)−∑j:pj<pKj 6 0 the above argument obviously applies), then
for at least some firm i ∈ Ω(p) the residual demand [D(p)−∑j:pj<pKj ]αi(Ω(p), Y (p))
is less than Ki, so that deviating to price p−, negligibly less than p, results
in an upward jump of i’s output, up to min
{
Ki, D(p− )−
∑
j:pj<p
Kj
}
.
This argument can easily be adapted to rule out strategy profiles where some
firm is playing a mixed strategy.
(ii) In the assumed circumstances (pc, pc, pc) is not an equilibrium. Hence
we just have to rule out strategy profiles such that p = max{p1, p2, p3} > pc.
Assume first D(p)−∑j:pj<pKj > 0. If #Ω(p) < 3, then any firm j /∈ Ω(p)
is selling its entire capacity, but it would still do so if it raised the price
to any level less than p. If #Ω(p) = 3, then residual demand is less than
capacity for at least some firm i, whereas its output would jump up to
min {Ki, D(p− )} if undercut. Next assume D(p) −
∑
j:pj<p
Kj 6 0. Any
i ∈ Ω(p) has failed to make a best response unless pc = 0 and ∑j:pj=0Kj >
X (the latter requiring that K > X). But this cannot be so if p1 > 0 given
that
∑
j 6=1Kj < X; if, instead, p1 = 0, then firm 1 has not made a best
response since
∑
j 6=1Kj < X.
Remark. Condition (3) gives rise to the classic Bertrand equilibrium.
Condition (4) can also be interpreted in terms of the Cournot model of quan-
tity competition among capacity-unconstrained firms. In fact condition (4)
identifies, in the (K1,K2,K3)-space, the region in which each firm’s capacity
is not higher than its best (capacity-unconstrained) quantity response when
the rivals supply their entire capacity (namely, the region that is bounded
above by the lower envelope of the Cournot best-response functions).8
8It should be noted that Assumption 1 does not guarantee the uniqueness of the
Cournot equilibrium. Uniqueness would be ensured if, for instance, one assumed
D′(p) + pD′′(p) < 0 on (0, p∗). (On this, see [6])
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Before studying equilibria in the region where pure strategy equilibria
do not exist, we need to enrich our notation. A strategy by firm i is denoted
by σi : (0,∞)→ [0, 1], where σi(p) = Prσi(pi < p) is the probability of firm i
charging less than p under strategy σi. Of course, any function σi(p) is non-
decreasing and everywhere continuous except at p◦ such that Prσi(pi = p◦) >
0, where it is left-continuous (limp→p◦− σi(p) = σi(p◦)), but not continuous.
An equilibrium is denoted by φ = (φ1, φ2, φ3), where φi(p) = Prφi(pi <
p). We use Π∗i (φ) = Π
∗
i (φi, φ−i) to denote firm i’s expected profit at the
equilibrium strategy profile φ and Πi(p, φ−i) for firm i’s expected profit
when it charges p with certainty and the rivals are playing the equilibrium
profile of strategies φ−i. Of course, Π∗i (φi, φ−i) > Π∗i (σi, φ−i) for each i and
Π∗i (φi, φ−i) > Πi(p, φ−i) for each i and each p. When no doubt can arise, and
for the sake of brevity, we also write Π∗i rather than Π
∗
i (φi, φ−i) and Πi(p)
rather than Πi(p, φ−i). Further, we denote by Si(φi) the support of φi and
by p
(i)
M (φi) and p
(i)
m (φi) the maximum and minimum of Si(φi), respectively.
More specifically, we say that p ∈ Si(φi) when φi(·) is increasing at p, that
is, when there is δ > 0 such that φi(p + h) > φi(p − h) for any 0 < h < δ,
whereas p /∈ Si(φi) if φi(p + h) = φi(p − h) for some h > 0. Obviously,
Π∗i = Πi(p) almost everywhere in Si(φi). Once again, when no doubt can
arise and for the sake of brevity, we also write Si rather than Si(φi), p
(i)
M
rather than p
(i)
M (φi), and p
(i)
m rather than p
(i)
m (φi). If Si is not connected,
i.e. if φi(p) is constant in an open interval (p˜, ˜˜p) whose endpoints are in Si
(p˜ ∈ Si and ˜˜p ∈ Si), then the interval (p˜, ˜˜p) will be referred to as a gap in Si.
In order to shorten notation, we denote limp→h+ Πi(p) and limp→h−Πi(p)
as Πi(h+) and Πi(h−), respectively, and limp→h+ φi(p) as φi(h+).
Some more notation is needed to investigate further the properties of
Πi(p). Let N = {1, 2, 3} be the set of firms, N−i = N − {i}, and P(N−i) =
{ψ} be the power set of N−i. Then, so long as firm i’s rivals’ equilibrium
strategies φ−i(p) are continuous in p, Πi(p) = Zi(p;φ−i(p)), where
Zi(p;ϕ−i) := p
∑
ψ∈P(N−i)
qi,ψ(p)
∏
r∈ψ
ϕr
∏
s∈N−i−ψ
(1− ϕs), (5)
ϕ’s are taken as independent variables (with the obvious constraints that
ϕj ∈ [0, 1], each j), and qi,ψ(p) = max{0,min{D(p)−
∑
r∈ψKr,Ki}} is firm
i’s output when it charges p, any firm r ∈ ψ charges less than p and any
firm s ∈ N−i − ψ charges more than p.9 If instead Prφj (pj = p◦) > 0 for
9Note that
∏
r∈ψ ϕr is the empty product, hence equal to 1, when ψ = ∅; and it is
similarly
∏
s∈N−i−ψ(1− ϕs) = 1 when ψ = N−i.
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some j 6= i, then Zi(p◦;φ−i(p◦)) > Πi(p◦) > limp→p◦+ Zi(p;φ−i(p)).10 Note
that since
∑
ψ∈P(N−i)
∏
r∈ψ ϕr
∏
s∈N−i−ψ(1 − ϕs) = 1, if ϕi ∈ [0, 1], then
the RHS of (5) is an average of the functions pqi,ψ(p)’s. As a consequence
pqi,N−i(p) 6 Zi(p;φ−i) 6 pqi,∅(p).
3 Equilibria under triopoly when no pure strategy
equilibrium exists: some general results
The analysis developed in this section refers to the region of the capacity
space where no pure strategy equilibrium exists, i.e. the region where
K1 > max
{
K −X,− P (K)
P ′(K)
}
(6)
and inequalities (1) hold.11
Since [15] it has been known that, in a duopoly,12
D.1 Π∗1 = maxp pq1,N−1(p);
D.2 p
(1)
M = p
(2)
M = pM , where
pM = arg max
p
pq1,N−1(p); (7)
D.3 p
(1)
m = p
(2)
m = pm, where pm is the price such that if firm 1 charges
this price and any other firm charges a higher price, then firm 1 gets
exactly Π∗1, as defined in D.1, i.e.
pm = min
{
p : pq1,∅(p) = Π∗1
}
; (8)
D.4 Π∗2 = pmK2;
D.5 if K1 = K2, then φ1(pM ) = φ2(pM ) = 1 whereas if K1 > K2,
φ1(pM ) < φ2(pM ) = 1.
10The exact value of Πi(p
◦) when Prφj (pj = p
◦) > 0 for some j 6= i depends on function
αi(Ω(p), Y (p)).
11Statements D.1, D.2 (with a small modification when K −K1 > X), D.3, and D.4
also applies to the region of the capacity space where pure strategy equilibrium exists.
12In the list each item is referred to with a capital D to indicate duopoly. However,
definitions are given in such a way that they are valid also in the triopoly. In a duopoly
N−1 = {K2}, obviously.
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Some of these results also hold in a triopoly, as will be shown in this
section.
The definitions of pM and pm also make it possible to characterize the
region where inequalities (6) and (1) hold by substituting inequality (6) with
inequality
P (K) < pm. (6
′)
Indeed, if K1 6 K−X, then pm = P (K) = 0 whereas if K1 6 − P (K)P ′(K) , then
pm = pM = P (K) > 0. Conversely, if inequality (6) holds, then inequality
(6′) holds too. Finally, note that in the region where inequalities (6) and
(1) hold we have:
pM = arg max
p
p
D(p)−∑
j 6=1
Kj
 (9)
pm = max{p̂, ̂̂p}, (10)
where
p̂ =
maxp p[D(p)−
∑
j 6=1Kj ]
K1
(11)
̂̂p = min
p : pD(p) = maxp p
D(p)−∑
j 6=1
Kj
 . (12)
Note that ̂̂p > p̂ if and only if D(p̂) 6 D(̂̂p) 6 K1. This is so sincê̂pD(̂̂p) = p̂K1 and the demand function is decreasing. In the remainder of
this section we see how statements D.1-D.5 generalize to triopoly. The fol-
lowing proposition states in our formalism a proposition concerning oligopoly
available in the literature. It generalizes to triopoly statements D.1 and
D.2. For a complete proof see [2] and [7]. See also [19], [17], and [14].
Proposition 2 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and inequality (6′) hold. In
any equilibrium φj(pM ) = 1 for any j such that Kj < K1; p
(i)
M = pM for
some i such that Ki = K1, and
Π∗i = maxp p
D(p)−∑
j 6=1
Kj
 (13)
for any i such that Ki = K1.
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Corollary 1 maxi p
(i)
M = pM .
Corollary 2 If p̂ > ̂̂p, then for any i such that Ki = K1, the equilibrium
payoff can also be written Π∗i = pmK1.
Corollary 3 If ̂̂p > p̂, then the equilibrium payoff of firm 1 can also be
written Π∗1 = pmD(pm) and K1 > D(pm) > D(pM ) > K2 +K3.
The following proposition generalizes statement D.3 to triopoly. Similar
generalizations were also provided by Ubeda [19] in a different context.
Proposition 3 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and inequality (6′) hold. In
any equilibrium (φ1, φ2, φ3):
(i) p
(j)
m > p(1)m for any firm j.
(ii) p
(i)
m = pm for any i such that Ki = K1.
Proof (i) Let p
(j)
m < p
(1)
m for some j ∈ N−1. Since D(pM ) >
∑
j 6=1Kj ,
then it would be Πj(p) = pKj > p
(j)
m Kj = Π
∗
j for p ∈ (p(j)m , p(1)m ), an obvious
contradiction.
(ii) If p
(1)
m > pm, then Π1(p) = pq1,∅(p) > Π∗1 in the interval (pm, p
(1)
m )
because of part (i). Hence p
(1)
m 6 pm. If p(1)m < pm, then Π1(p) 6 pq1,∅(p) <
pmq1,∅(pm) = Π∗1 in the interval [p
(1)
m , pm). Hence p
(1)
m = pm.
Corollary 4 mini p
(i)
m = pm.
Let M = {i ∈ N : p(i)M = pM} and L = {i ∈ N : p(i)m = pm}. The
following proposition establishes quite expected properties of equilibria in
the region defined by inequalities (6) and (1).
Proposition 4 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and inequality (6′) hold. In
any equilibrium (φ1, φ2, φ3):
(i) for any i ∈ N , Π∗i = Πi(p) for p in the interior of Si and for p = p(i)m ;
(ii) for any p◦ ∈ (pm, pM ), D(p◦) <
∑
i:p
(i)
m <p◦
Ki;
(iii) #L > 2;
(iv) If (p◦, p◦◦) ⊂ Si, then (p◦, p◦◦) ⊂ ∪j 6=iSj;
(v) For any i ∈ L− {1}, Π∗i = pmKi;
(vi) D(pm) <
∑
j∈LKj;
(vii) For any i 6= 1 such that p(i)M > P (K1), Π∗i = pmKi;
(viii) if K2 > K3 and Π
∗
i = pmKi (each i), then either D(pm) ≥ K1 +K2
or D(pm) ≤ K1 +K3;
(ix) #M > 2.
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Proof
(i) Suppose contrariwise that Π∗i > Πi(p
◦) for some p◦ in the interior
of Si. Then, since Πi(p
◦) ≥ Πi(p◦+)13 it would be Πi(p) < Π∗i on a right
neighbourhood of p◦, contrary to the fact that p◦ is internal to Si. Nor can
it be Π∗i > Πi(p
(i)
m ). This derives from the argument above if p ∈ Si for
p > p
(i)
m and sufficiently close to p
(i)
m . If instead p
(i)
m is an isolated point of
Si, the contradiction is that Prφi(pi = p
(i)
m ) > 0 even though Πi(p
(i)
m ) < Π∗i .
(ii) Otherwise Πi(p) = pKi > Πi(p
(i)
m ) = Π∗i for p ∈ (p(i)m , p◦], an obvious
contradiction.
(iii) Assume contrariwise that L = {i}. Then, on a right neighborhood
of pm, Πi(p) = pqi,∅(p) > pmqi,∅(pm) = Πi(pm) = Π∗i : an obvious contradic-
tion.
(iv) See Appendix A.
(v) pmKi = Πi(pm−) 6 Πi(pm) 6 pmqi,∅(pm) 6 pmKi: inequalities are
obvious; the equality holds since D(pm) > D(pM ) >
∑
j 6=1Kj > Ki.
(vi) If D(pm) >
∑
j∈LKj , then Πi(p) (each i ∈ L) would be increasing
on a right neighborhood of pm. If D(pm) =
∑
j∈LKj , then L = {1, i},
by Proposition 3(i) and inequality (6’). On a neighborhood of pm either
p ∈ S1 ∩ Si or p /∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 because of part (iv). In the latter case
φ2(pm+) > 0 and Π1(p) = pφi(pm+)[D(p)−Ki]+p [1− φi(pm+)]K1, which
is increasing in p, on a neighborhood of pm. In the former case
Π∗1 = Π1(p) = pφi(p)[D(p)−Ki] + p [1− φi(p)]K1
on a neighborhood of pm. By Corollary 2, Π
∗
1 = pmK1 and hence φi(p) =
(p−pm)K1
p[D(pm)−D(p)] . But then φi(pm+) =
K1
−pmD′(pm) > 1 since K1 > D(pm) −
K2 −K3 > −pmD′(pm).
(vii) If i ∈ L the claim follows from part (v). Let i /∈ L and therefore,
because of parts (iii) and (v), j ∈ L and Π∗j = pmKj . If, for some p > P (K1),
Πi(p) = pKi(1− φ1(p)) > pmKi, then also Πj(p) = pKj(1− φ1(p)) > pmKj
and firm j has not made a best response.
(viii) If K1 +K3 < D(pm) < K1 +K2, then
• L 6= {1, 2, 3} otherwise φ2(p) =
√
K1
K2
p−pm
p , φ3(p) =
D(p)−K1−K2
K3
+
K2
K3
φ2(p), and φ3(p) < 0 on a right neighbourhood of pm since φ3(pm+) =
D(pm)−K1−K2
K3
< 0;
13Πi(p
◦) > limp→p◦+ Πi(p) only if firm j 6= i charges p◦ with positive probability.
12
• L 6= {1, 3} otherwise Πi(p) = pKi > pmKi = Π∗i (each i ∈ L) on a
right neighbourhood of pm;
• L 6= {1, 2} otherwise Π3(p) = (1− φ1(p)φ2(p))K3p > pmK3 on a right
neighbourhood of pm: the inequality is equivalent to (p−pm) [K1 +K2(1− φ2(p))−D(p)] >
0 since φ1(p) =
(p−pm)K2
(K1+K2−D(p))p .
(ix) See Appendix A.
Corollary 5 Π∗2 > pmK2, Π∗3 > pmK3.
The following proposition generalizes to triopoly statement D.5; fur-
thermore, it shows that if several firms have the largest capacity, then their
equilibrium strategies are necessarily the same (this symmetry need not
arise for equally-sized firms that are smaller than the largest one, as will be
clarified by Proposition 6).
Proposition 5 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and inequality (6′) hold. In
any equilibrium (φ1, φ2, φ3):
(i) if K1 > K2, then φ1(pM ) < 1;
(ii) if K1 = K2 > K3, then: (ii.a) φ1(pM ) = φ2(pM ) = 1, (ii.b) p
(3)
M <
pM , (ii.c) p
(1)
M = p
(2)
M = pM , (ii.d) φ2(p) = φ1(p) throughout [pm, pM ].
(iii) if K1 = K2 = K3, then: p
(1)
M = p
(2)
M = p
(3)
M = pM , φ3(p) = φ2(p) =
φ1(p) throughout [pm, pM ], φ1(pM ) = φ2(pM ) = φ3(pM ) = 1.
Proof (i) If φ1(pM ) = 1, then φj(pM ) = 1 (each j) because of Proposi-
tion 2. Let i ∈M−{1}, then Π∗i = Πi(pM−) = Zi(pM ; 1, 1) = pMqi,N−i(pM ).
This implies an obvious contradiction if pMqi,N−i(pM ) 6 0. A similar con-
tradiction holds if pMqi,N−i(pM ) > 0 too since
[
d
dppqi,N−i(p)
]
p=pM
< 0 and
therefore Πi(p) > pqi,N−i(p) > pMqi,N−i(pM ) = Π∗i for p in a left neighbour-
hood of pM .
(ii.a) If, say, φ1(pM ) < φ2(pM ) = 1, then Π2(pM−) > Π1(pM ) = Π∗1,
contrary to Proposition 2. Nor can φ2(pM ) and φ1(pM ) be both less than 1,
since then Π2(pM−) > Π2(pM ).
(ii.b) Because of part (ii.a), if p
(3)
M = pM , then the contradiction pointed
out in the proof of part (i) holds.
(ii.c) Because of part (ii.b) and Proposition 4(ix).
(ii.d) and (iii) See Appendix A.
13
Finally the following proposition, whose proof is in Appendix A, gener-
alizes to triopoly statement D.4.
Proposition 6 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and inequality (6′) hold. In
any equilibrium (φ1, φ2, φ3):
(i) Π∗2 = pmK2;
(ii) if K2 = K3, then Π
∗
2 = Π
∗
3;
(iii) if K2 = K3 and φi(p
◦) < φj(p◦) (i, j 6= 1) for some p◦ ∈ S2 ∪ S3,
then (iii.a) K2 < K1; further, (iii.b) if p
◦ ∈ S2 ∩ S3, then p◦ > P (K1),
whereas (iii.c) if p◦ < P (K1), then Si ∩ [p◦, P (K1)) = ∅.
4 On the equilibrium payoff of firm 3
Our next major task is to determine Π∗3 when K3 < K2. We know from
Proposition 4(v)&(vii) that if 3 ∈ L or p(3)M ≥ P (K1), then Π∗3 = pmK3; but
we do not know yet when this is the case. We know also, from Proposition
4(viii) and Corollary 5, that Π∗3 may be larger than pmK3, but we have to
determine when this holds and the level of Π∗3. We introduce the following
partition of the region defined by inequalities (6) and (1).
A = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3, D(p̂) 6 K1}.
B = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K > D(p̂) > K1 +K2}.
C1 = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K1 +K2 > D(p̂) > K1 +K3}.
C2 = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K1 +K3 > D(p̂), D(pM ) > K1}
C3 = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K1 + K3 > D(p̂), D(pM ) < K1 <
D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
}
D = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K1 + K3 > D(p̂), D(pM ) <
D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
6 K1 < D(p̂)}14
E = {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 = K3,K1 < D(p̂)}.
We will prove that Π∗3 = pmK3 in sets A, B, D, and E: in sets A and
D because p
(3)
M ≥ P (K1), in sets B and D because 3 ∈ L (but L = {1, 2, 3}
in B and L = {1, 3} in D), in set E because K3 = K2. We will prove also
that pmK3 < Π
∗
3 6 pim in set C1 ∪C2 ∪C3, where pim will be defined in this
section. The exact value of Π∗3 in this set cannot be determined without
determining at the same time also the profile of equilibrium strategies and
therefore the determination of Π∗3 in this set will be postponed to another
paper.
14If K1 +K3 > D(p̂), then D(pM ) < D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
since the latter inequality is equivalent
to pM (K1 −K3) > p̂K1 = pM (D(pM )−K2 −K3).
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In order to recognize that the intersection of any two of the above sets
is empty whereas their union is set {(K1,K2,K3) : K1 > K2 > K3,K >
D(pm)}, i.e. the region defined by inequalities (1) and (6′), we construct
the partition through a chain of increasingly finer partitions. First of all,
we distinguish three sub-regions, that in which ̂̂p > p̂, that in which p̂ > ̂̂p
and K2 > K3, and that in which p̂ > ̂̂p and K2 = K3. The first sub-
region is actually set A and the third sub-region is actually set E. The
second sub-region is partitioned into three parts, defined by conditions K >
D(p̂) > K1 +K2, K1 +K2 > D(p̂) > K1 +K3, and K1 +K3 > D(p̂) > K1,
respectively. The first part consists of set B. The second part consists of
set C1. The third part is partitioned into the sets C2 (D(pM ) > K1), C3
(D(pM ) < K1 < D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
), andD (D(pM ) < D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
6 K1 < D(p̂)).
It is checked that actually
• K1 > K2 whenever D(pM ) 6 K1 +K3, hence in A∪C2 ∪C3 ∪D, and
in part of B ∪ C1 ∪ E,
• K1 > K2 + K3 whenever D(pM ) 6 K1, hence in A ∪ C3 ∪ D and in
part of B ∪ C1 ∪ C2 ∪ E, and
• K1 +K3 > D(p̂) whenever D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
6 K1 6 D(p̂), hence in D and
in part of E.15
The aim of this section is to state the following Theorem 1. From the
previous section we know the values of Π∗1, Π∗2 and, of course, Π∗3 when
K3 = K2 (see Propositions 2 and 6). Among other things, the theorem
states that Π∗3 = pmK3 everywhere except in C1∪C2∪C3 and determines the
maximum value that Π∗3 can assume in this set. The following Proposition 7
(proof in Appendix A) introduces functions φ?1j(p), φ
?
j (p), φ
??
1j (p), and φ
??
j (p)
(j = 2, 3) to be used in Theorem 1 and in next section.
Proposition 7 Let K1 + Kj > D(pm) > K1 (some j 6= 1). (i) Denote by
φ?1j(p) =
(p−pm)Kj
p[K1+Kj−D(p)] and φ
?
j (p) =
(p−pm)K1
p[K1+Kj−D(p)] the solutions of equations
pmKj = Zj(p;ϕ1, 0) and pmK1 = Z1(p;ϕj , 0), respectively, over the range
{pm,min{P (K1), pM}). Then φ?1j(p) and φ?j (p) are increasing over the range
15The first two remarks are obvious consequences of the fact thatD(pM ) > K2+K3. The
third remark is a consequence of inequalities p̂K1 ≥ P (K1)[D(P (K1)) −K3] ≥ p̂[D(p̂) −
K3]. These two inequalities hold since the former is equivalent to
p̂K1
K1−K3 ≥ P (K1) and
the latter is a consequence of the facts that function p(D(p)−K3) is increasing over the
range [pm, pM ].
15
[pm,min{p˜(j)M , P (K1)}], where p˜(j)M is the unique solution in [pm, pM ] of the
equation K1pm = [D(p)−Kj ]p.
(ii) Denote by φ??1j (p) and φ
??
j (p) the solutions of equations pmKj =
Zj(p;ϕ1, 1) and pmK1 = Z1(p;ϕj , 1), respectively. Then:
(ii.a) Over the range [pm,min{P (K1 + K3), pM}], φ??12(p) = (p−pm)K2p[K−D(p)]
and φ??2 (p) =
K1
K2
φ??1 (p), which are both increasing.
(ii.b) Over the range [pm,min{P (K1 + K3), pM}], φ??13(p) = p−pmp and
φ??3 (p) =
p[D(p)−K2]−K1pm
K3p
, which are both increasing.
(ii.c) Over the range [max{P (K1 + K3), pm}, pM ], φ??1j (p) = p−pmp and
φ??j (p) =
p[D(p)−Ki]−K1pm
Kjp
, (i 6= 1, j) which are both increasing.
Theorem 1.16 Let the region defined by inequalities (6) and (1) be
partitioned as above. (a) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ A, then in any equilibrium
pm = ̂̂p and Π∗1 = pmD(pm); Π∗j = pmKj (each j 6= 1).
(b) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ B, then in any equilibrium pm = p̂, Π∗i = pmKi
for all i, L = {1, 2, 3}.
(c) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ C1 ∪C2 ∪C3, then (c.i) in any equilibrium pm = p̂,
Π∗i = pmKi for i 6= 3, L = {1, 2}, and pmK3 < Π∗3 6 pim, where pim =
max
p∈[pm,min{P (K1),p˜(2)M }]
F (p) > F (min{P (K1), p˜(2)M }) = pmK3, F (p) = Z3(p;φ?12(p), φ?2(p)).
Furthermore, p
(3)
M < P (K1) and (c.ii) M = {1, 2}.
(d) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ D, then in any equilibrium pm = p̂, Π∗i = pmKi
for all i, L = {1, 3} and p(2)m > P (K1).
(e) If (K1,K2,K3) ∈ E, then in any equilibrium pm = p̂ and Π∗i = pmKi
for all i.
Proof The assertions about pm, Π
∗
1 and Π
∗
2 in the various parts follow
straightforwardly from Propositions 2, 3, and 6(i) and Corollaries 2 and 3.
(a) Since D(p̂)p̂ 6 K1p̂ = D(̂̂p)̂̂p, pm = ̂̂p. Then Proposition 4(vii)
completes the proof.
(b) L = {1, 2, 3} because of Proposition 4(vi); Π∗3 = pmK3 because of
Proposition 4(v).
(c.i) See Appendix A.
16Hirata discovered to a large extent that L = {1, 2, 3} in sets A ∪B ∪ E ([14], Claims
3 and 6), but he was not concerned with Prφi(pi = pm) = 0. He recognized the fact
that p
(3)
m > pm and Π
∗
3 > pmK3 in what is here called C1, C2, and C3 ([14], Claims 4
and 5), but he was not concerned with how p
(3)
m and Π
∗
3 are then determined. Hirata also
recognized that p
(2)
m > pm and Π
∗
3 = pmK3 in our set D ([14], Claim 5),
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(c.ii) Let us partition set C1 into subsets C11 (D(pM ) > K1 + K3), C12
(K1 + K3 > D(pM ) > K1), C13 (D(pM ) 6 K1). The claim is already
proved in C13 and C3 (see part (c.i)). As to the other subsets, we be-
gin by ruling out the event M = {1, 2, 3}. Under this event, Π2(pM−) =
Z2(pM ;φ−2(pM )) = Π∗2 and Π3(pM−) = Z3(pM ;φ−3(pM )) = Π∗3. These two
equations contradict each other in these subsets when, according to Propo-
sition 2, φ2(pM ) = φ3(pM ) = 1: if the former holds, then Π3(pM−) < Π∗3
and the latter cannot hold. Let us see how this works in each case. Note
that in C2∪C12, D(pM ) 6 K1 +K3. Hence, under our working assumption,
Π∗2 = pmK2 = pM [1 − φ1(pM )]K2: thus, φ1(pM ) = 1 − pm/pM , in turn im-
plying Z3(pM ) = pM [1−φ1(pM )]K3 = pmK3, contrary to part (c.i). In C11,
Π∗2 = pmK2 = Z2(pM ) = pM [φ1(pM )(D(pM )−K1−K3) + (1−φ1(pM ))K2],
that is, φ1(pM ) =
pM−pm
pM
K2
K−D(pM ) . By substituting this into Z3(pM ) =
pM [1 − φ1(pM )]K3 obtain Z3(pM ) = pM [K1+K3−D(pM )]+pmK2K−D(pM ) K3 < pmK3
since K1 + K3 < D(pM ); hence again part (c.i) is contradicted. It re-
mains to dismiss the event of M = {1, 3} in C11 ∪ C12 ∪ C2. This is done
by showing that otherwise Π2(p) > Π
∗
2 in a left neighborhood of pM . If
p
(2)
M < pM in C11 ∪ C12 ∪ C2, then Π3(pM−) = pM [1 − φ1(pM )]K3 = Π∗3 >
pmK3, implying φ1(pM ) = 1 − Π
∗
3
pMK3
< 1 − pmpM and hence Π2(pM−) =
pMφ1(pM ) max{0, D(pM )−K1 −K3}+ pM [1− φ1(pM )]K2 > pmK2 = Π∗2.
(d) See Appendix A.
(e) Follows from Proposition 6(ii).
5 Examples
The first example is devoted to illustrate Proposition 6(iii).
Example 1. Let D(p) = 1 − p, and (K1,K2,K3) = (34 , 18 , 18). Then,
pM =
3
8 , Π
∗
1 =
9
64 , pm =
3
16 , and Π
∗
2 = Π
∗
3 =
3
128 . Note that P (K1) =
3
4 <
pM . Let real number h ∈ [12 , 1], then it is easily checked that the following
Nash equilibrium exists.
• For p ∈ [pm, ph], where ph is such that φ2(ph) = h,
φ1(p) =
√√√√{[p (K1 +K2 −D (p))
(p− pm)K2
]2
+
K1
K22
p (D (p)−K1)
(p− pm)
}−1
,
φ2(p) = φ3(p) = 1− K2
D(p)−K1
[
1− p− pm
pφ1(p)
]
;
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• for p ∈ [ph, P (K1)]
φ1(p) =
(p− pm)K2
p [(1− h)(K1 +K2 −D (p)) + hK2]
φ2(p) =
(p− pm)K1 + ph(D(p)−K1 −K2)
p [(1− h)(K1 +K2 −D (p)) + hK2]
φ3(p) = h;
• for p ∈ [P (K1), pM ] = [14 , 38 ], φ1(p) = 16p−316p , φ2(p) = 64p(1−p)−9−8pφ3(p)8p
where φ3(p) is any non-decreasing function whose derivative is not
higher than 9−64p
2
8p2
, φ3(P (K1)) = h, and φ3(pM ) = 1.
Note that φ2(p) = φ3(p) for each p if and only if h =
3
4 and φ3(p) =
64p(1−p)−9
16p for p > P (K1). Further, if h <
1
2 , then φ2(P (K1)) 6 1 does not
hold.
The other examples are devoted to illustrate Theorem 1(c). In Example
2 Π∗3 = pim, whereas in Examples 3 and 4 Π∗3 < pim. In Examples 2 and 3
S1 = S2 ∪ S3 = [pm, pM ] whereas in Example 4 S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 6= [pm, pM ].
Moreover in Example 4 firm 3 charges price p
(3)
M with positive probability.
Example 2. Let D(p) = 20 − p and (K1,K2,K3) = (15, 4, 0.5). Then,
pM = 7.75, Π
∗
1 = 60.0625, pm = 4.00416, and Π
∗
2 = 16.016. Note that
(15, 4, 0.5) ∈ C1 since P (K1 +K2) = 1 < pm = 4.00416 < P (K1 +K3) = 4.5.
We partition [pm, pM ] into α = [pm, p
(3)
m ), β = [p
(3)
m , p
(3)
M ), and γ = [p
(3)
M , pM ].
In α, φ1(p) = φ
∗
12(p) =
4(4.00416−p)
p(1−p) and φ2(p) = φ
∗
2(p) =
15(4.00416−p)
p(1−p) . One
can easily check that arg maxp∈[pm,P (K1)] Z3(p, φ
∗
12(p), φ
∗
2(p)) = P (K1 +K3).
Let p
(3)
m = P (K1 + K3) = 4.5 and Π
∗
3 = Z3(p
(3)
m , φ∗12(p
(3)
m ), φ∗2(p
(3)
m )) ≈
2.11620. To find p
(3)
M , note that, in γ, φ
∗∗
12(p) = 1− (pm/p) = 1− (4.00416/p)
and φ∗∗2 (p) =
p(D(p)−K3)−Π∗1
pK2
= p(19.5−p)−60.06254p . Then by solving equation
Z3(p, φ
∗∗
12(p), φ
∗∗
12(p)) = Π
∗
3 over the range [p
(3)
m , P (K1)], we obtain p
(3)
M ≈
4.66038. Turning to range β, denote the solutions to system
Π∗i = Zi(p;ϕ−i), i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (14)
by φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), and φ◦3(p).17 One can check that [φ◦′2 (p)]p=p(3)M
< 0. How-
ever a gap (p˜, p
(3)
M ) in S2 gives the solution; p˜ is found by solving φ
◦
2(p) =
17System (14) leads to a second-degree algebraic equation, only one of the solutions for
φ◦2(p) being nonnegative.
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φ◦2(p
(3)
M ) = .487931 over (p
(3)
m , p
(3)
M ), which yields p˜ ≈ 4.57316. Further, one
can check that φ◦1(p), φ◦2(p), and φ◦3(p) are all increasing throughout [p
(3)
m , p˜].
To sum up: S1 = [4.00416, 7.75], S2 = [4.00416, 4.57316] ∪ [4.66038, 7.75],
and S3 = [4.5, 4.66038].
Example 3. Let D(p) = 1− p and (K1,K2,K3) = (51/64, 3/16, 1/16).
Then, pM = 3/8, Π
∗
1 = 9/64, pm = 3/17, and Π
∗
2 = 9/272. Note that
(51/64, 3/16, 1/16) ∈ C3 since P (K1 + K3) = 9/64 < pm = 3/17 and
pM = 3/8 > P (K1) = 13/64 >
K1pm
K1−K3 = 153/799 > pm = 3/17. It is calcu-
lated that pim ≈ 0.0111064372457363291. But if we followed the procedure
used in Example 2 we would obtain that p
(3)
m ≈ 0.185285078457503860, and
p
(3)
M ≈ 0.1990076200; φ◦2(p) is concave in p and φ◦2(p(3)m ) ≈ 0.2234432780 >
φ◦2(p
(3)
M ) ≈ 0.1699261147. Hence this cannot be a solution. However a reduc-
tion of the payoff of firm 3 to Π∗3 ≈ 0.01110349997, with S∗3 = [p(3)m , p(3)M )] ≈
[0.1832877785, 0.1991977634] coincident with a gap in S∗2 , solves the prob-
lem.
Example 4. Let D(p) = 20 − p, (K1,K2,K3) = (16; 5; 0.2). Then
pM = 7.40, Π
∗
1 = 54.76, pm = 3.4225, and Π
∗
2 = 17.1125. Note that
(16; 5; 0.2) ∈ C1 since pm = 3.4225 < P (K1 + K3) = 3.8. It is found that
arg maxZ3(p, φ
∗
12(p), φ
∗
2(p)) = P (K1 + K3) = 3.8 and pim = 0.7339571913.
But
[∂Z3(p;ϕ1,ϕ2)/∂p]
p=P (K1+K3)
+;ϕ1=φ
∗
12(p);ϕ2=φ
∗
2(p)
< 0,
and therefore p
(3)
m < P (K1 +K3). In fact, if p
(3)
m = P (K1 +K3) then Π3(p) <
Π∗3 = pim for p larger than P (K1+K3), implying that Pr(p3 = P (K1+K3)) =
1. But then Z2(p;φ
∗
1(P (K1+K3), 1) < pmK2 for p ∈ (P (K1+K3); 3.817544)
and Z2(p;φ
∗
1(P (K1+K3), 1) > pmK2 on a right neighbourhood of 3.817544)
whereas Z1(p;φ
∗
2(P (K1+K3), 1) < pmK1 for p ∈ (P (K1+K3); 3.823921831):
as a consequence Z2(p;φ1(P (K1 + K3), 1) > Π
∗
2 (an obvious contradiction)
for p ∈ (3.817544; 3.823921831). However an equilibrium exists in which
(p
(3)
m , P (K1 +K3)] ∩ S2 = ∅, [p(3)m , P (K1 +K3)] = S3 ⊂ S1, Pr(p3 = P (K1 +
K3)) = 1 − φ3(P (K1 + K3)) > 0, and p /∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 for p larger than
and close enough to P (K1 +K3). This equilibrium is given by the following
functions
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φ1(p) =

(p−pm)K2
p[K1+K2−D(p)] p ∈ [pm, p
(3)
m ]
pK3−Π∗3
pK3
p
(3)
m [K1+K2−D(p(3)m )]
(p
(3)
m −pm)K1
p ∈ [p(3)m , P (K1 +K3)]
P (K1+K3)K3−Π∗3
P (K1+K3)K3
p
(3)
m [K1+K2−D(p(3)m )]
(p
(3)
m −pm)K1
p ∈ [P (K1 +K3), p˜]
p−pm
p p ∈ [p˜; pM ]
φ2(p) =

(p−pm)K1
p[K1+K2−D(p)] p ∈ [pm, p
(3)
m ]
(p
(3)
m −pm)K1
p
(3)
m [K1+K2−D(p(3)m )]
p ∈ [p(3)m , p˜]
p[D(p)−K3]−pmK1
pK2
p ∈ [p˜, pM ]
φ3(p) =

0 p ∈ [pm, p(3)m ]
p−pm
pK3
p
(3)
m [K1+K2−D(p(3)m )]
p
(3)
m −pm
+ D(p)−K1−K2]K3 p ∈ [p
(3)
m , P (K1 +K3))
1 p ∈ [P (K1 +K3), pM ]
where p
(3)
m , Π∗3 and p˜ are the solutions of the following system:
Π∗3 = p
(3)
m
1−( (p(3)m − pm)
p
(3)
m (K1 +K2 −D(p(3)m ))
)2
K1K2
K3 (15)
[P (K1 +K3)K3 −Π∗3]
p
(3)
m [K1 +K2 −D(p(3)m )]
P (K1 +K3)(p
(3)
m − pm)K1K3
=
p˜− pm
p˜
(16)
(p
(3)
m − pm)K1
p
(3)
m [K1 +K2 −D(p(3)m )]
=
p˜[D(p˜)−K3]− pmK1
p˜K2
(17)
It is found that p
(3)
m = 3.7982466455, p˜ = 3.821618795, Π∗3 = 0.7338170986.
This solution to system (15)-(17) is unique since equation (15) determines
Π∗3 as an increasing function of p
(3)
m ; equation (17) determines p˜ as an in-
creasing functions of p
(3)
m ; then the RHS of equation (16) is an increasing
function of p
(3)
m whereas the LHS is decreasing. Hence, S1 = [pm; 3.8] ∪
[3.821618795; 7.40], S2 = [pm, 3.7982466455]∪[3.821618795; 7.40], S3 = [3.7982466455; 3.80],
and Pr(p3 = P (K1 +K3) = 0.9079374281.
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6 Appendix A
Many proofs in this appendix are obtained by exploiting the properties of
functions Zi(p;ϕ−i) (see equations (5)) in which the ϕj are independent
variables. These properties are summarized in the following Lemma 1. It
addresses concavity of Zi in terms of p and clarifies how the impact of the
ϕj ’s upon Zi depends upon p and the firms’ capacities.
Sometimes we factorize ϕj and (1− ϕj) in equation (5)) to obtain
Zi(p;ϕr, ϕj) = ϕjZi(p;ϕr, 1) + (1− ϕj)Zi(p;ϕr, 0). (18)
Zi(p;ϕr, 1) and Zi(p;ϕr, 0)) have a clear interpretation: they are firm i’s
expected payoffs when charging p, conditional on pj < p and pj > p, respec-
tively, when Pr(pr < p) = ϕr and Pr(pr > p) = 1− ϕr.
Lemma 1
(i) Zi(p;ϕ−i) (each i) is continuous and almost everywhere twice differ-
entiable in p throughout [pm, pM ]. Exceptions may arise at p = P (K1 +Kr)
(r 6= 1) and at p = P (K1). Let p = P (K1 + Kr); if ϕ1ϕr > 0, then
[∂Zi(p;ϕ−i)/∂p]p=P (K1+Kr)− < [∂Zi(p;ϕ−i)/∂p]p=P (K1+Kr)+ (i 6= 1, r); if
ϕ1(1−ϕj) > 0 (j 6= 1, r), then [∂Zr(p;ϕ−r)/∂p]p=P (K1+Kr)− > [∂Zr(p;ϕ−r)/∂p]p=P (K1+Kr)+
(each r 6= 1); if ϕr(1−ϕj) > 0 (j 6= 1, r), then [∂Z1(p;ϕ−1)/∂p]p=P (K1+Kr)− >
[∂Z1(p;ϕ−1)/∂p]p=P (K1+Kr)+ . Let p = P (K1); if ϕ1(1 − ϕr) > 0 (i 6= 1, r),
then [∂Zi(p;ϕ−i)/∂p]p=P (K1)− < [∂Zi(p;ϕ−i)/∂p]p=P (K1)+ (each i 6= 1); if
(1−ϕ2)(1−ϕ3) > 0, then [∂Z1(p;ϕ−1)/∂p]p=P (K1)− > [∂Z1(p;ϕ−1)/∂p]p=P (K1)+ .
(ii) Z1(p;ϕ2, ϕ3) is concave and increasing in p throughout [pm, pM ].
(iii) Zi(p;ϕ−i) (each i 6= 1) is concave in p over any range enclosed in
(pm, pM ) in which it is differentiable; local convexity only arises at P (K1 +
Kr) ∈ (pm, pM ) (r 6= 1, i), if ϕ1ϕr > 0, and at P (K1) ∈ (pm, pM ), if ϕ1(1−
ϕr) > 0 (r 6= 1, i).
(iv) In any range enclosed in [pm, pM ) where Zi(p;ϕ1, ϕj) (i, j = 2, 3) is
concave in p, but not strictly concave, it is increasing in p, provided that
ϕ1 < 1.
(v) Zi(p;ϕ−i) is continuous and differentiable in ϕj and ∂Zi/∂ϕj ≤ 0,
each i and j 6= i. More precisely: if p ∈ (pm, P (K1)), then ∂Zi/∂ϕj < 0,
each i and j 6= i; if p ≥ P (K1), then ∂Z1/∂ϕj < 0, ∂Zi/∂ϕ1 < 0, and
∂Zi/∂ϕj = 0 (each i 6= 1 and j 6= 1, i).
(vi) IfKi = Kj and ϕi 6 ϕj , then Zi(p;ϕ−i) 6 Zj(p;ϕ−j) and Zi(p;ϕ−i) <
Zj(p;ϕ−j) whenever ϕi < ϕj and ∂Zi/∂ϕj < 0.
(vii) If Ki 6 Kj and ϕi > ϕj = 0, then (Kj/Ki)Zi(p;ϕ−i) > Zj(p;ϕ−j).
Proof
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(i) For given ϕ−i, Zi(p;ϕ−i) is a weighted arithmetic average of functions
pqi,ψ(p), each of which is almost everywhere twice differentiable: the only
exception arises when P (K1 +Kr) ∈ (pm, pM ) (r 6= 1, i) and when P (K1) ∈
(pm, pM ). Indeed[
∂pqi,{1,r}(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1+Kr)−
=
[
pD′(p)
]
p=P (K1+Kr)
<
<
[
∂pqi,{1,r}(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1+Kr)+
= 0 (i 6= 1, r),[
∂pqr,{1}(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1+Kr)−
= Kr >
>
[
∂pqr,{1}(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1+Kr)+
= Kr +
[
pD′(p)
]
p=P (K1+Kr)
,[
∂pq1,{r}(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1+Kr)−
= K1 >
>
[
∂pq1,{r}(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1+Kr)+
= K1 +
[
pD′(p)
]
p=P (K1+Kr)
,[
∂pqi,{1}(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1)−
=
[
pD′(p)
]
p=P (K1)
<
<
[
∂pqi,{1}(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1)+
= 0 (i 6= 1),[
∂pq1,∅(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1)−
= K1 >
>
[
∂pq1,∅(p)/∂p
]
p=P (K1)+
= K1 +
[
pD′(p)
]
p=P (K1)
.
(ii) For each ϕ2 and ϕ3, function Z1(p;ϕ2, ϕ3) is a weighted arithmetic
average of functions of p each of which is concave and increasing over the
range [pm, pM ]. This derives from the concavity of pD(p) and the fact that
p[D(p)−K2 −K3] is increasing.
(iii) Functions pqi,ψ(p) are concave everywhere they are twice differen-
tiable. Part (i) completes the proof.
(iv) By definition ∂2Zi(p;ϕ1, ϕj)/∂p
2 = 0 in a range if and only if
Zi(p;ϕ1, ϕj) is either proportional to pKi or equal to 0. The latter can-
not hold for p ∈ [pm, pM ) and ϕ1 < 1.
(v) For a given p, Zi(p;ϕj , ϕr) is a polynomial of degree 2 (or lower) in
ϕj and ϕr. Hence it is everywhere continuously differentiable with respect
to ϕj and ϕr. Partial differentiation of (18) yields
∂Zi
∂ϕj
= Zi(p;ϕr, 1)− Zi(p;ϕr, 0).
Then it is easily checked that Zi(p;ϕ1, 1) = Zi(p;ϕ1, 0) = p(1 − ϕ1)Ki for
p > P (K1), each i 6= 1 and each j 6= i, 1 whereas Zi(p;ϕr, 1) < Zi(p;ϕr, 0)
in all the other cases.
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(vi) Since Ki = Kj , Zi(p;ϕr, β) = Zj(p;ϕr, β). Hence, taking account of
equation (18), Zi(p;ϕ−i)−Zj(p;ϕ−j) = ϕjZi(p;ϕr, 1)+(1−ϕj)Zi(p;ϕr, 0)−
ϕiZi(p;ϕr, 1)− (1− ϕi)Zi(p;ϕr, 0) = (ϕj − ϕi) [Zi(p;ϕr, 1)− Zi(p;ϕr, 0)] =
(ϕj − ϕi)∂Zi/∂ϕj .
(vii) From equation (18) and since ϕi > ϕj = 0, Zi(p;ϕ−i) = Zi(p;ϕr, 0)
whereas Zj(p;ϕ−j) ≤ Zj(p;ϕr, 0) because of part (vi). Thus it suffices
to prove that (Kj/Ki)Zi(p;ϕr, 0) ≥ Zj(p;ϕr, 0). This is done by noting
that for any qi,ψ(p) with a positive coefficient in Zi(p;ϕr, 0) there is a cor-
responding qj,ψ(p) with a positive coefficient in Zj(p;ϕr, 0), based on the
same ψ ∈ P(N−i−j) = {{r}, ∅}, and vice versa. The claim follows since
(Kj/Ki)qi,ψ(p) > qj,ψ(p) for each ψ ∈ P(N−i−j).
Proof of part (iv) of Proposition 4
(iv) If φ−i(p) is constant over (p◦, p◦◦), then dΠi(p)/dp = ∂Zi(p;φ−i(p◦))/∂p 6=
0 over part of Si. The inequality is an obvious consequence of Lemma 1(ii)-
(iv).
The following Lemma 2 deals with atoms in the support of some equi-
librium strategy that are internal to the range [pm, pM ]. This will be helpful
when computing the equilibrium whenever such an atom exists, as is the
case with the data of Example 4.
Lemma 2 Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 and inequality (6′) hold. In
any equilibrium (φ1, φ2, φ3) in which φj(p
◦) < φj(p◦+) for some j and some
p◦ ∈ (pm, pM )
(i) Π∗j = Πj(p
◦) = Zj(p◦;φ−j(p◦));
(ii) there is p◦◦ > p◦ such that (S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3) ∩ (p◦, p◦◦) = ∅ and p◦◦ ∈
S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3;
(iii) limp→p◦+ ∂Zj(p, φ−j(p◦))/∂p ≤ 0;
(iv) Kj < K1;
(v) p◦ < P (K1).
Proof
(i) If Πj(p
◦) < Zj(p◦;φ−j(p◦)), then firm j has not made a best response
by charging p◦ with positive probability.
(ii) If there is p◦◦◦ > p◦ such that (p◦, p◦◦◦) ⊆ Sh, then (p◦, p◦◦◦) ⊆
Sh ∩ Si because of Proposition 4(iv). Then {h, i, j} = {2, 3} otherwise,
by Lemma 1(v), Π∗k = Πk(p
◦+) < Πk(p◦−), k ∈ {h, i} and k 6= j: an
obvious contradiction. But then Π∗k = Πk(p) = p[1 − φ1(p◦)]Kk on a right
neighbourhood of p◦: another obvious contradiction.
(iii) Otherwise Πj(p) > Πj(p
◦) on a right neighbourhood of p◦ because
of part (ii).
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(iv) Because of part (iii) and Lemma 1(ii).
(v) It is an obvious consequence of parts (ii), (iii) and (iv).
Proof of part (ix) of Proposition 4
(ix) If M = {1}, then pM > p(i)M > p(j)M (i 6= 1, j 6= 1, i; if p(2)M = p(3)M , then
with no loss of generality, Pr(pj = p
(j)
M ) = 0). Moreover, S1 ∩ (p(i)M , pM ) = ∅
since Π1(p) = p[D(p)−K2−K3] < Π∗1 for p ∈ (p(i)M , pM ). Because of Lemma
2, Pr(p1 = p
(i)
M ) = 0 and Zi(p
(i)
M , φ−i(p
(i)
M )) = Π
∗
i , whether Pr(pi = p
(i)
M ) = 0
or not. Then the obvious contradiction that Πi(p) > Πi(p
(i)
M ) on the right
of p
(i)
M is obtained. Indeed if D(p
(i)
M ) ≤ K1 + Kj , then ∂Zi(p, φ−i(p))/∂p =
[1 − φ1(p(i)M )]Ki > 0 on a right neighbourhood of p(i)M . If, on the contrary,
D(p
(i)
M ) > K1 + Kj , then D(pm) > K1 + Kj and therefore Π
∗
i = pmKi
because of parts (v) and (vi). As a consequence φ1(p
(i)
M ) =
(p
(i)
M−pm)Ki
p
(i)
M (K−D(p
(i)
M ))
since Zi(p
(i)
M ;φ1(p
(i)
M ), 1) = pmKi. Moreover,
Πi(p) = Zi(p;φ1(p
(i)
M ), 1) = p[φ1(p
(i)
M )(D(p)−K1 −Kj) +
(
1− φ1(p(i)M )
)
Ki]
for p ∈ [p(i)M ,min{P (K1 +Kj), pM}]. Hence in this interval
dΠi(p)
dp
=
∂Zi(p;φ1(p
(i)
M ), 1)
∂p
=
Ki
p
(i)
M
[
K −D(p(i)M )
]×
{
(p
(i)
M−pm)
[
D(p) + pD′(p)−K2 −K3
]
+pmK1−p(i)M
[
D(p
(i)
M )−K2 −K3
] }
> 0.
Proof of parts (ii.d) and (iii) of Proposition 5
(ii.d) If φ2(p
◦) > φ1(p◦) at p◦ ∈ S1, then, by Lemma 1(v), Π2(p◦) >
Π1(p
◦) = Π∗1, contrary to Proposition 2. If φ2(p◦) > φ1(p◦) at p◦ ∈ S2 − S1,
then, because of parts (ii.a) and (ii.b), φ1(p) should jump up at some p < pM
in order to avoid the previous contradictions, contrary to Lemma 2(iv).
(iii) Along the same lines of the proof of part (ii).
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) If K2 = K1, then Π
∗
2 = pmK2 because of Proposition 3(ii) and Propo-
sition 4(v). Next, let K2 < K1. If p
(2)
m = pm, then Π
∗
2 = pmK2 because
of Proposition 4(v). If p
(2)
m > pm, then Π
∗
2 = Z2(p
(2)
m ;φ−2(p
(2)
m )) and, by
Proposition 4(iii), p
(3)
m = pm and Π
∗
3 = pmK3. Hence pmK2 = (K2/K3)Π
∗
3 >
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(K2/K3)Z3(p
(2)
m ;φ−3(p
(2)
m )) > Z2(p(2)m ;φ−2(p(2)m )) = Π∗2 > Π2(pm−) = pmK2,
the second inequality being a consequence of Lemma 1(vii).
(ii) Along the same lines of the proof of part (i).
(iii.a) An obvious consequence of Proposition 5(iii).
(iii.b) [∂Zi(p;ϕ−i)/∂ϕj ]ϕ−i=φ−i(p◦) = 0, otherwise part (ii) would be vi-
olated: hence, by Lemma 1(v), p◦ > P (K1).
(iii.c) Because of part (iii.b) p◦ /∈ S2 ∩ S3; more specifically p◦ /∈ Si
and p◦ ∈ Sj , since, by Lemma 1(v)-(vi), Zi(p◦, φ−i(p◦)) < Zj(p◦, φ−j(p◦)).
Let p◦◦ = minp>p◦ Si: clearly, φi(p◦◦) < φj(p◦◦). Then, unless p◦◦ >
P (K1), we get the following contradiction: Π
∗
j > Zj(p◦◦, φ1(p◦◦), φi(p◦◦)) >
Zi(p
◦◦, φ1(p◦◦), φj(p◦◦)) = Π∗i = Π
∗
j , because of Lemma 1(v)-(vi).
Proof of Proposition 7
(i) It is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1(ii)&(v) since φ?1j(p) <
φ?j (p) 6 1.
(ii.a) It is immediately recognized that φ??2 (p) 6 1 whenever p 6 pM
(the equality holds if and only if p = pM ). Thus, by Lemma 1(ii), φ
??
12(p) is
increasing over the range under concern, obviously implying the same as for
φ??2 (p).
(ii,b)-(ii,c) It is immediately recognized that φ??j (pM ) = 1 and that φ
??
1j (p)
is increasing. To prove that φ??j (p) is increasing too it is sufficient to observe
that K1pm > (D(p)−K2−K3)p > −D′(p)p2. Both inequalities are satisfied
as strict inequalities for p ∈ [pm, pM ) and as equalities for p = pM .
Proof of parts (c.i) and (d) of Theorem 1
(c.i) We will first establish some properties of any equilibrium in which
L = {1, 2}; then we will prove that necessarily L 6= {1, 2, 3} and L 6= {1, 3}.
It is immediately recognized that if L = {1, 2}, then Π3(p)/K3 > Π2(p)/K2
for p larger than and sufficiently close to pm. Hence Π
∗
3 > pmK3. Con-
sequently, p
(3)
M < P (K1), by Proposition 4(vii). Hence φ1(p) = φ
?
12(p)
and φ2(p) = φ
?
2(p) (see Proposition 7(i)) in a neighborhood of pm and
pmK3 < Π
∗
3 6 pim since, clearly, Π∗3 = Π3(p
(3)
m ) = F (p
(3)
m ). Now we will
prove that in no equilibrium L = {1, 2, 3}. This is obvious in C1 because
of Proposition 4(viii)&(v). In C2 ∪ C3, by way of contradiction, denote by
(φ̂1(p), φ̂2(p), φ̂3(p)) the equilibrium strategy profile on a neighborhood of
pm. The equations Π
∗
1 = Z1(p; φ̂2(p), φ̂3(p)) and Π
∗
2 = Z2(p; φ̂1(p), φ̂3(p))
imply φ̂1(p) <
(p−pm)K2
p[K1+K2−D(p)] and φ̂2(p) <
(p−pm)K1
p[K1+K2−D(p)] since φ̂3(p) > 0 and
Lemma 1(v) holds. Consequently, a fortiori Z3(p; φ̂1(p), φ̂2(p)) > pmK3,
contrary to Proposition 4(v). Finally we will prove that in no equilib-
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rium L = {1, 3}. This claim obviously holds in C1, because of Proposi-
tion 4(viii). By simple calculation we obtain that Z2(p;φ
?
13(p), φ
?
3(p)) <
pmK2 (see Proposition 7(i)) over (pm, P (K1)) and therefore it should be
p
(2)
m > P (K1) because of Proposition 6(i)). An immediate contradiction
is obtained in C2 since pM 6 P (K1) (note that p(2)m = p(2)M = pM would
contradict Proposition 2). As for C3, it cannot be [pm, P (K1)] ⊆ S1 ∩ S3
since then φ3
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
> 1 (an obvious contradiction), given that p̂K1K1−K3 <
P (K1) ≤ pM . Nor there exist p◦ 6 p˜(3)M (see Proposition 7(i)) such that
[pm, p
◦] ⊂ S1 ∩ S3 and p /∈ S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 on a sufficiently small right neigh-
bourhood of p◦ (note that no atom may exist in pm because of Propo-
sition 4(v)-(vi)). This is so because [∂Z1/∂p]p=p◦,ϕ3=φ?3(p◦)
> 0 so that
Z1(p;φ−1(p)) > pmK1 on a right neighbourhood of p◦.
(d) We will first establish some properties of any equilibrium in which
L = {1, 3}; then we will prove that necessarily L 6= {1, 2, 3} and L 6= {1, 2}.
If L = {1, 3}, following an argument in the proof of part (c.i), Π2(p) is
lower than pmK2 at any p < P (K1) and therefore p
(2)
m > P (K1). No con-
tradiction arise since pM > P (K1) and
p̂K1
K1−K3 > P (K1). Then the event
of L = {1, 2, 3} is ruled out as in the proof of part (c.i). Under the event
L = {1, 2}, following the proof of part (c.i) we obtain Π∗3 > pmK3 and
p
(3)
M < P (K1). Then Z1(p, φ−1(p)) = p[D(p)−K3]p−φ2(p)K2 < pmK1 in the
interval (p
(3)
M , P (K1)]. The inequality holds since the function p[D(p)−K3] is
increasing for any p ≤ pM and p̂K1 ≥ P (K1)[K1−K3]. Hence (p(3)M , P (K1))∩
S1 = ∅ and, because of Proposition 4(iv), (p(3)M , P (K1)) ∩ S2 = ∅ too. As
a consequence φ1(p) = φ1(p
(3)
M ) over the range (p
(3)
M , P (K1)]. Moreover
φ1(P (K1)) = φ1(p
(3)
M ) < φ
?
13(p
(3)
M ) < φ
?
13(P (K1)) =
P (K1)−pm
P (K1)
(see Propo-
sition 7(i)); the first inequality holds because of Lemma 1(v) and equation
Π∗3 = Z3(p, φ1(p
(3)
M ), φ2(p
(3)
M )), since Π
∗
3 > pmK3 and φ2(p
(3)
M ) > 0; the sec-
ond inequality holds since D
(
p̂K1
K1−K3
)
≤ K1 and therefore φ?3(P (K1)) 6 1.
Hence Z2(P (K1), φ−2(P (K1))) > pmK2, which contradicts Proposition 6(i).
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